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The Practicalities of Goal-Based Safety
Regulation
J Penny, A Eaton CAA (SRG)
PG Bishop, RE Bloomfield (Adelard)
1 Introduction
 “Goal-based regulation” does not specify the means of achieving compliance but
sets goals that allow alternative ways of achieving compliance, e.g. “People shall
be prevented from falling over the edge of the cliff”. In “prescriptive regulation”
the specific means of achieving compliance is mandated, e.g. “You shall install a 1
meter high rail at the edge of the cliff”.
 There is an increasing tendency to adopt a goal-based approach to safety
regulation, and there are good technical and commercial reasons for believing this
approach is preferable to more prescriptive regulation. It is however important to
address the practical problems associated with goal-based regulation in order for it
to be applied effectively.
 This paper will first discuss the motivation for adopting a goal-based regulatory
approach, and then illustrate the implementation by describing SW01 which forms
part of the CAP 670 [CAA 1998] regulations for ground-based air traffic services
(ATS). We will then discuss potential barriers to the implementation of such
standards and how these difficulties can be addressed.
2 Regulatory context and motivation
The Robens Report [Robens 1972] and the Cullen Enquiry [Cullen 1990] were
major drivers behind the UK Regulatory agencies exploring the benefits of
introducing goal-based regulations. The reports noted several shortcomings with
prescriptive safety regulations.
Firstly, with prescriptive regulations, the service provider is only required to carry
out the mandated actions to discharge his legal responsibilities. If these actions
then prove to be insufficient to prevent a subsequent accident, it is the regulations
and those that set them that are seen to be deficient. Thus safety is viewed as the
responsibility of the regulator and not the service provider whose responsibility, in
law, it actually is.
Secondly, prescriptive regulations tend to be a distillation of past experience and,
as such, can prove at best to be inappropriate and at worst to create unnecessary
dangers in industries that are technically innovative. It is the innovator that is best
placed to ensure the safety of their design, not the regulator. Clearly prescriptive
safety regulations are unable to cope with a diversity of design solutions.
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Thirdly, prescriptive regulations encode the best engineering practice at the time
that they were written and rapidly become deficient where best practice is
changing e.g. with evolving technologies. In fact it is quite probable that
prescriptive regulations eventually prevent the service provider from adopting
current best practice.
Another driver for adopting goal-based regulation, from a legal viewpoint, is that
overly-restrictive regulation may be viewed as a barrier to open markets. Various
international agreements, EC Directives and Regulations are intended to promote
open markets and equivalent safety across nations. Whilst it is necessary to
prescribe interoperability requirements and minimum levels of safety, prescription
in other areas would defeat the aim of facilitating open markets and competition.
Finally, from a commercial viewpoint,  prescriptive regulations could affect the
cost and technical quality of available solutions provided by commercial suppliers.
So there are clear benefits in adopting a goal-based approach as it gives greater
freedom in developing technical solutions and accommodating different standards.
However, in order to adopt a goal-based approach, it is necessary to provide a
coherent and convincing safety justification.
A common argument made to substantiate a claim that current best practice has
been followed is to claim adherence to an international standard. This presents the
regulator with a challenge as many safety assurance standards exist, coming from
various industry sectors. Each one reflects the needs of its sector with respect to
legal framework, supply chain characteristics and problem domain. Having
encouraged open markets between sectors and countries, and given the service
provider freedom of solution, he is fully entitled to call upon any of them. It is
therefore necessary for the regulator to ensure that a parity of assurance is
provided regardless of the assurance standard used. The regulator can address this
issue by defining the credible bounds of an acceptable safety argument and the
supporting evidence for each goal. The service provider is therefore required to
argue how the evidence collected by using the assurance standard stays within
these bounds and meets the goals. This offers an additional benefit of deterring
service providers from preparing untenable arguments.
This then raises the question of what is sufficient argument and evidence to
support a claim. Obviously the regulator gains confidence (that the claim is true) as
the depth and strength (rigour) of the argument and evidence presented increases.
The degree of confidence, that a regulator will require, varies with the risk
attached to the claim being made. Such risks include the consequences of the claim
being proved wrong and the believability of the claim. These risks are addressed
by introducing the concept of Assurance Evidence Levels (AELs) to describe
different levels of rigour of argument and evidence to be presented. It is important
that the AEL is not confused with Safety Integrity Level (SIL), Design Integrity
Level (DAL) or any other index used in assurance standards to identify appropriate
practices for a particular integrity claim. Whilst such indexes are also risk based,
they are used to help the service provider demonstrate compliance with best
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practice, rather than to define what the regulator requires in order to have
confidence that he can approve the system for use.
A goal-based approach can be applied at any level from the top-level system
downwards. It is important that there are clear links between the top-level goals
and the sub-goals. At each level, the regulator requires explicit safety goals,
convincing arguments to justify the goals are met and adequate evidence to
support the arguments. In practice the rigour of the arguments and the amount of
evidence will depend on the safety significance of the individual system functions.
To illustrate the issues we will describe the approach adopted in the CAA Safety
Regulation Group (SRG) for ground-based ATS systems that provide
communications, surveillance and navigation services for aircraft. SRG regulate
the safety of these services in three main ways:
! Approval of a safety management system. For large organisations like
National Air Traffic Services (NATS), production and approval of safety
cases is implemented “in-house” in accordance with the approved safety
management procedures. The role of the SRG is to audit the implementation
of safety management system and the associated safety cases.
! Approval of safety cases submitted directly to the SRG (typically from smaller
organisations).
! Approval against the requirements in CAP 670
For both audit and approval, the regulator requires assurance that safety goals will
be met. To assist this process the SRG have been developing a goal-based
approach to regulation covering software aspects of ATS under the CAP 670
regulations.
3 Goal-based Approach Developed in SW01
At the time of writing, SW01 is in draft form and is being circulated for comment.
The first version was produced in conjunction with York Software Ltd (YSL) and
subsequent versions were produced with the assistance of Adelard and CSE
International Ltd.
These regulatory requirements are intended to be used in conjunction with a
higher-level system safety methodology (e.g. as in IEC 61508 [IEC 1998] or ARP
4754 [SAE 1996]). This would cover aspects such as the identification of safety-
related functions, system hazards, the system architecture, the allocation of
functions to subsystems and the required assurance level.
SW01 sets goals for the assurance needed to show that the software requirements
identified from the system safety level analysis have been implemented. In practice
there is some iteration between these levels, for example software-level hazards
have to be included in the system hazard analysis and this could lead to revised
software requirements.
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SW01 draws on a number of approaches to implementing a goal-based strategy.
The first published implementation of this type of approach was the SafeIT
standards framework [Bloomfield 1990] and, more recently, work on safety cases
[Adelard 1998] sets out a claim, argument, evidence based structure. Furthermore
the UK Ministry of Defence’s  (MoD) policy paper on Commercial Of the Shelf
(COTS) software [MOD 1999] defines a similar policy but as yet there is no
detailed guidance on its implementation. The UK Health and Safety Executive
(HSE) has sponsored the development of a framework for COTS that also takes a
safety argument based approach. Drafts have already been made available for
industry comment and the final version should be published early in 2001.
3.1 Safety Goals
SW01 defines a prime software safety objective to be met for ATS systems that
contains software and three sub-objectives. These are shown in table 1 below:
Safety Objectives
Prime software safety objective
To ensure that the risks associated with deploying any software used in a
safety related ATS system have been reduced to a tolerable level and are
As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
Sub objectives
To ensure that arguments and evidence are available which show that the
Software Safety Requirements correctly state what is necessary and
sufficient to achieve adequate safety, in the system context.
To ensure that arguments and evidence are available, in which there is
sufficient confidence, which show that the software satisfies its safety
requirements.
To ensure that arguments and evidence are available which show that all
Safety Requirements can be traced to the design, are realised in the
implementation of the software, and that other functions implemented in
the software do not adversely affect safety.
Table 1 SW01 Safety Objectives
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3.2 The Regulator’s Perspective
From the perspective of the regulator, the objective is subtly different, namely:
For arguments and assurance evidence to be available which show that
the risks associated with deploying any software used in a safety related
ATS system are tolerable and ALARP (As Low As Reasonably
Practicable).
In other words it is not enough to produce a safe system, explicit evidence is
required to convince the regulator that the risks are tolerable and ALARP. SW01
breaks down this top-level assurance objective into sub-objectives (Table 2) that
should achieve the goals; the rationale for the sub-goals is discussed below.
Assurance Objectives
CONFIGURATION
CONSISTENCY
To ensure that the arguments and evidence, for the
safety of the software in the system context, are at
all times derived from: a known executable
version of the software, a known range of
adaptation data, and a known set of software
products and descriptions that have been used in
the production of that version.
REQUIREMENTS
VALIDITY
To ensure that arguments and evidence are
available which show that the Software Safety
Requirements correctly state what is necessary and
sufficient to achieve adequate safety, in the system
context. (This includes requirements to control
hazards identified during implementation)
REQUIREMENTS
TRACEABILITY
To ensure that arguments and evidence are
available which show that all Safety requirements
can be traced to the design, are realised in the
implementation of the software, and that other
functions implemented in the software do not
adversely affect safety.
REQUIREMENTS
SATISFACTION
To ensure that arguments and evidence are
available, in which there is sufficient confidence,
which show that the software satisfies its safety
requirements.
Table 2 SW01 Assurance objectives
The following sections describe the background to these objectives and the
regulatory requirements that flow from them. Figure 1 provides an overview of the
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SW01 structure.
Claim S1
SW Risks
are
acceptable
Arguments
which
describe the
relationship
between the
safety claim
and the
regulatory
claims
(These
arguments
are provided
in SW01)
Claim A1.2
Requirements
Validity
Claim A1.1
Configuration
Consistency
Claim A1.3
Requirements
Satisfaction
Claim A1.4
Traceability
Arguments
Direct Evidence
Backing Evidence
The arguments and evidence shown
here have to be created by  the
service provider
A Typical claim satisfying objective
A1.1 would be:
"All evidence is derived from the
delivered software"
This claim is
needed to satisfy
higher level
(System) claims
A1.1 is the objective:
"To ensure that the arguments and
evidence for the safety of the software
...are... derived from a known
executable version of the software and
range of adaptation data..."
The limitations of an acceptable
safety argument and its supporting
evidence are defined in SW01
Figure 1 The safety case structure defined by SW01
Configuration consistency
The first regulatory objective is needed because evidence gathered from the
development of the product has to be shown to be directly related to the product
before it can be used to support an argument about its performance. This objective
is called the Configuration Consistency Objective and relates to the wide ranging
documentation produced during the software and safety life-cycle. A
comprehensive list of development documentation which may be needed to
provide evidence is defined in SW01; such artefacts include: source code, object
code, system and software requirements, verification data, design data, hazard
analyses, data describing the development and test environment, etc.
Requirements validity
Unsafe behaviour causes accidents. Consequently, in SW01, the focus on Software
Safety Requirements is the behavioural requirements for software. Safety
constraints placed upon the software are assumed to be transformed into
behavioural requirements during the system safety process.
Each software safety requirement consists of a set of behavioural attributes of
interest, these can include: functional properties, timing properties, robustness,
reliability, accuracy, resource usage and overload tolerance. Thus a software safety
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requirement should define behaviour by specifying the requirement in terms of one
or more of these attributes. In fact requirements with complete behaviours are
sought, where all relevant attributes are specified in a single requirement. If an
attribute is excluded from a software safety requirement an argument is required to
justify its exclusion.
There are three main reasons for this stance. Firstly it is probably simpler to
analyse the validity and completeness of a requirement if all its attributes are in
one place, and one can be reasonably certain that it is independent of other
requirements. Secondly, since each requirement describes a complete behaviour
and there is a straightforward relationship between behaviour and hazard then the
associated AEL can be readily defined. Finally the number of requirements and
hence AELs are reduced to a manageable quantity.
During software design (and even during implementation and maintenance) design
decisions are made which may have an adverse impact on system safety. For
example the choice of an operating system is likely to have a significant impact on
the safety claims which, realistically, can be made. Furthermore it is unlikely that
the choice of an operating system is made at the system level. In order to preserve
the safety properties of the system a hazard analysis should be performed on all
design decisions. If a hazard is detected then defences against it propagating and
leading to an accident should be defined. Such defences could be procedural, or
implemented in hardware or software. In any case the requirement for the defence
must be written down. Where the defence is to be implemented in software the
requirement is a software safety requirement (a derived requirement) and is
considered to be added to the set of Software Safety Requirements which have
been delivered to the software development process. Closing this loop provides the
assurance that the Software Safety Requirements are complete.
Requirements Satisfaction
SW01 takes the view that software safety comes partly from the correct and
complete implementation of those safety requirements which the software
implements (called Software Safety Requirements). These Software Safety
Requirements can be decomposed using architectural techniques, and the resulting
architecture can be assessed (using a knowledge of the system and its operational
environment) for its impact on safety, yielding yet more Software Safety
Requirements (called Derived Software Safety Requirements). All of these
Software Safety Requirements have to be implemented correctly and completely
for the system to be considered safe. In SW01 showing that the requirements have
been implemented correctly is called Requirements Satisfaction.
Requirements Traceability
The other view of software safety springs from the ease with which functions can
be implemented in software and the difficulty in keeping such functions
independent of each other. Implementing the Software Safety Requirements
correctly and completely is therefore a necessary but insufficient condition for
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system safety. In addition, other functions implemented in the software, which are
not safety related, must be shown to have no adverse safety impact.
Additionally, during the software development process, functions may be
introduced which have repercussions on the safety of the ATS system, even though
they may not have been introduced to meet a safety requirement. These will need
to be assessed and, if necessary, new or changed Software Safety Requirements
will have to be generated. Even if the function requirement has no impact on
safety, its implementation may have. Therefore, all the Software Safety
Requirements must be traceable to the implementation and all elements of the
implementation must be shown to have no adverse safety impact. In SW01 this is
called Requirements Traceability.
3.3 Level of assurance
As part of the overall objective that the risks are tolerable and ALARP, the
regulator requires assurance evidence that is commensurate with the software risks.
In order to indicate to the developer the degree of assurance required by the
regulator, we have developed the concept of an assurance evidence level (AEL).
The AEL is an index running from AEL1 to AEL5—the higher the number, the
greater the rigour of the supporting arguments and evidence. AELs are assigned to
Software Safety Requirements to identify the depth and strength of software
assurance evidence that must be made available for the equipment approval
process.
Although the AEL is primarily set by the safety criticality of the function (i.e.
based on the higher level system safety analysis), in practice the strength and
rigour of the evidence required by a regulator will also be dependent on a number
of subjective “shaping factors”, i.e.:
! requirements complexity (e.g. complex functionality, stringent timing)
! implementation difficulty (e.g. novelty of solution)
! organisational factors (e.g. complexity of organisational structure, number of
subcontractors)
 For example, a project under stress, implementing a complex requirement, with a
long contractual chain and inexperienced contractors should receive more
regulatory oversight than another with a single experience contractor implementing
a small system very similar to one that has been successfully implemented in the
past. However, we were unable to come up with an acceptable system for
describing this in the published document. The AELs have to be established by the
ATS service provider and accepted by the regulator.
 AELs should not be confused with the SILs defined in IEC 61508.
 3.4 Evidence
 SW01 identifies two types of assurance evidence that can be used in support of
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claims that these objectives have been met:
! Direct Evidence: this is evidence that is directly related to the claim being
made
! Backing Evidence: this is evidence that the direct evidence is both credible
and soundly based
Direct evidence is taken from direct measurements of the artefact (note: the
artefact could be a design representation of the final product as in static analysis).
Other evidence attests to the trustworthiness of the direct evidence or supports an
argument of engineering judgement by providing evidence from other sources e.g.
equivalent technologies, physical laws. This form of evidence is called “backing”
evidence.
Evidence may be gathered from three sources: testing, field service experience and
analysis. Here testing is restricted to tests of the final product or a close relation,
e.g. host machine tests. Analysis, however, is used in its widest sense and includes
inspections and reviews, tests on indirect artefacts such as static analysis and
simulations, as well as evidence which supports logical arguments.
Clearly evidence, drawn from a single source, needed to support an argument,
must consist of both direct and backing evidence. What is less clear is that a single
claim can always be justified by evidence from a single source. As the severity of
the potential accidents, to which the software can contribute, increases then it is
unlikely that an argument can justifiably be assembled which uses evidence from a
single source. Two aspects of evidence underpin this view. Firstly, the evidence
may “run out of steam” and not clearly demonstrate that a performance target has
been met. This is particularly true of reliability claims, where it is recognised that
testing is only convincing below a Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF) of about
105 hrs. Secondly, as claims require arguments that are deeper and more rigorous,
the potential for “missing” something increases and it is comforting to have
independent evidence drawn from more than one source. For this reason a second
independent argument (both direct and backing) is expected for the higher AELs—
this is termed a Secondary Argument in SW01.
4 Implementation Issues
A goal-based approach, like the one used in SW01, has obvious benefits as it
imposes fewer constraints on the implementation, both in terms of processes (e.g.
the standards used) and in technical solutions (e.g. the use of off-the-shelf
software). The goal-based approach is also useful to the safety assessor, as the
questions focus on safety-related outcomes (e.g. “what evidence do you have to
show that display updates occur within x seconds?).
However, in a safety goal-based approach, it is not sufficient to demonstrate
compliance to a generic safety process (such as IEC 61508). Convincing
arguments have to be constructed that relate to the behaviour of the specific
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product and its safety properties and this can be difficult for contractors to adopt.
In other words there is need to shift from documenting how hard people have tried
to develop a system, to providing evidence and arguments about the behaviour of
that system.
Goal-based safety standards have been used in other sectors (such as parts of the
UK Ministry of Defence Standards 00-55 and 00-56). These standards have been
used for several years now, but experience indicates that some contractors find it
difficult to formulate reasonable arguments or provide convincing evidence. There
are a several reasons for this:
! Limited safety expertise. Safety expertise is in short supply, and contractors
may have to buy-in the skills; such staff may not be aware of the specific
sector safety issues or the processes use to produce the product.
! Lack of integration with design. Safety is often viewed as a “bolt on” feature,
and safety personnel are expected to justify the system after it has been
designed. Ideally development of the safety arguments should occur in parallel
with the design and influence design choices in favour of solutions where it is
easier to make safety arguments.
! Lack of supporting evidence. This could be due to design choices (e.g. use of
off-the-shelf components with little evidence of integrity) or development
deficiencies (e.g. inadequate tests to demonstrate the safety goals or
inadequate documentation of fault histories where important data on say
operating time has not been collected).
 These are not insurmountable , but will require a significant “culture change” to
overcome and organisations and people can be slow to adapt to new methods. The
key factor is Management commitment to change, but the process can be eased by
supporting measures such as:
! Exchange of experience. If acceptable safety arguments or specific safety
cases can be made available (e.g. via industry safety clubs or safety bodies),
this experience could help to train newcomers.
! Training materials and guidance. These could include worked examples and
templates to show how the safety arguments are identified and supported by
evidence. Although in practice it might be hard to find safety cases that are not
commercially confidential.
! Support tools. The process of constructing and reviewing safety arguments
can be assisted by safety argument tools like [ASCE] and [SAM]. For
example the ASCE tool allows the structure of the argument to be constructed
graphically and can also generate text based reports and display associated
safety documents (e.g. in Word or Excel). An example argument exported
from ASCE is shown in Figure 2.
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CLAIM :
Adequately
safe
EVIDENCE: System
Description
CLAIM : Is
safe now
CLAIM :
Continues to
be safe
EVIDENCE:
Safety
M anagem ent
activities
CLAIM : Usage
w arningCLAIM : no
functional
safety
ARGUM ENT: No
control
function
CLAIM : W orkplace
H&S adequate
ARGUM ENT:
Relevant
standards applied
e.g 00-56, JSP
454
EVIDENCE:
PHI EVIDENCE:
PHA
EVIDENCE:
Safety Review
EVIDENCE: XX PHAEVIDENCE: Unit 1
PHA
ARGUM ENT:
Historically safe
ARGUM ENT:
Sites inspected
as part of PHA
ARGUM ENT: Apply
recom ended safety
im provem ents
ARGUM ENT: Only
m inor safety
im provem ents
recom m ended
CLAIM : Safety
M anagem ent
activities
EVIDENCE: Hazard Log
is evidence for
is evidence for
is a subclaim  of
is a subclaim  of
is evidence for
is a subclaim  of
is a subclaim  of
supports
is a subclaim  of
supports
is evidence for
is evidence for
is evidence for
is evidence for
is evidence for
is evidence for is evidence for
is evidence for
is evidence for
supports supports
supports
supports
is a subclaim  of
is evidence for
 Figure 2.  Example argument exported from ASCE
! Re-usable safety justifications. The justification effort could be reduced if
justifications for software components are re-used over several projects (e.g.
an operating system or a database). Similarly if the same system is deployed
on different sites similar safety arguments can be deployed, although changes
will be needed to take account of the safety requirements of specific sites.
 At the other end of the scale, there are experienced organisations with well-
established safety management systems (SMS) that have been approved by safety
regulators. The safety arguments are developed and maintained internally, but are
subject to sample audits by the regulator. In this case there is no lack of expertise,
but there is no guarantee the safety justifications will have a goal-based form
unless the organisation has explicitly adopted this approach. Nevertheless
regulations like SW01 can be used to derive auditing questionnaires to check that
the relevant goals are addressed and, in the longer term, the requirements of SW01
could influence the structure of new safety cases as cases compliant with the
regulation will be easier to licence. This process could be aided by the supporting
measures discussed earlier.
 Another aspect that needs to be addressed is the role of standards such as IEC
61508 or RTCA DO178B [RTCA 1992].  Within any given project, different
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standards may have been used for different parts (including off-the-shelf
components); how does this fit in with a goal-based approach? Demonstration of
compliance to a standard is a useful source of evidence for a goal-based approach.
In particular, compliance can support claims for configuration consistency,
traceability and functional correctness to a given assurance level. However this
process evidence is likely to need supplementing with evidence about the product
(e.g. via testing, analysis or field experience) that demonstrates the achievement of
requirements.
 There are also system level aspects to be considered in applying this approach. A
goal-based approach can be applied at any level including the top-level system.
Based on the criticality of the system and the safety function, safety requirements
and assurance levels need to be set for the subsystems. Setting the assurance level
is a considerable challenge and needs to take account of factors such as:
! the consequences of system failure
! the degree of mitigation for component failures
! project risk factors such as novel technology and complex requirements
While it is desirable to have a well-defined decision procedure so that the assigned
assurance levels are appropriate, excessive assurance would affect project costs
and completion times, while insufficient assurance could affect safety. As
mentioned above it was not possible in the development of SW01 to find a
procedure that was appropriate for a regulation although we have prototyped a
number of approaches (scoring methods, decision graphs) that might help.
5 Summary and conclusions
 There are clear benefits in adopting a goal-based approach to safety regulation as it
gives greater freedom in developing technical solutions and accommodating
different standards. A specific example has been described which has been
developed for air traffic management software. It explains the reasoning
underlying the goal-based approach and the sub-goals and assurance levels
required by the regulator and includes features, such as:
! the identification of software safety goals
! a defined relationship between these safety goals and regulatory goals
! an index (AEL) which addresses the consequences of failing to meet a claim
and the believability of the claim
! bounds on the acceptability of arguments and evidence
which are specifically related to the goal-based approach.
However, it has to be recognised that such regulations represent a significant
“paradigm shift” i.e. a transition from:
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! a process compliance approach to a product orientated, safety property
approach
! a tick-box mentality to argument-based mind-set
 Past experience indicates there can be considerable problems in achieving such a
culture change within an organisation due to limited safety expertise, poor
integration with the design process, and lack of convincing supporting evidence.
With these constraints experience indicates that it might take several years to adopt
fully. It is therefore important that standards are supported by accompanying
measures to facilitate their introduction, such as:
! exchange of experience through special interest groups
! training material and guidance documents
! supporting tools
! re-usable and “model” safety argument examples
These strategies should ease the transition form a prescriptive to a goal-based
standards approach.
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